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SOMALIA: A SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report was prepared for the Bureau for Program Review and Policy 
Coordination (PPC) in AID/Washington and the USAID mission in Mogadishu. It 
represents part of a broader experimental effort by AID/Washington to make 
better use of social science information about country specific institutions 
in tailoring development initiatives to the distinctive institutional 
landscape of particular countries. USAID mission management in Mogadishu 
welcomed the opportunity to review the distinctive social and institutional 
environment of Somalia because: 
o Basic statistical data on population characteristics and needs, 
resource availability and distribution, production and 
consumption, health and access to social services in Somalia are 
unavailable or unreliable. 
o Fundamental processes of production, exchange, access to assets 
and resource accumulation are poorly understood, as are the 
distinctive social groups, relationships and cultural beliefs that 
shape these processes. 
o Drought, war and rapidly changing international political 
alignments have driven the pace and direction of program 
development with little time for socioeconomic research. 
o Somalia is currently re-evaluating its development policies in 
light of its recent experience with central planning, collective 
forms of production and public sector controls over commodity 
markets. 
OBJECTIVES 
The overall objectives of the report are to examine the explicit and 
implicit socioeconomic assumptions that have informed development planning in 
Somalia in light of available information about the ways its peoples are 
organized and make a living, and on the basis of this examination, to 
recommend modifications in policies, programs, and projects intended to 
increase the effectiveness of development assistance in Somalia, and identify 
critical issues for future research. 
APPROACH 
Our conceptual approach, which reflects these objectives, was to focus 
on the strategies by which differing types of individuals, households, and 
other resource management units earn incomes, avoid risk, save, and invest; 
and on the ways these strategies affect and are affected by the wider economic 
and policy environment. It is an approach that views people's income 
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generating behavior as the product of choice and not tradition. It anticipates 
that many of them may have mixed income strategies, that their degree of 
participation in a sector - for example, in agriculture - is likely to be 
affected by the return they expect from activities in other sectors. It 
assumes that people's income strategies are likely to be dynamic, adaptive, 
and flexible and that persistent patterns of apparently "irrational" economic 
behavior may, in fact, be quite sensible when understood in context. And it 
assumes that people's adaptive income generating strategies must be understood 
in relation to the social and institutional context which shapes opportunities 
and choices. 
Our procedure was to review USAID, World Bank, and other donor program 
and project documents and on-the-ground projects to identify key assumptions 
about binding constraints in Somali systems of production and exchange. Each 
assumption was examined in light of consistency and plausibility, evidence 
from a review of the social science literature on Somalia, and our knowledge 
of comparative studies of pastoralism, dryland farming, flood recession 
agriculture, and commodity and labor markets in other developing countries in 
Africa. 
We gave priority to assumptions that are pivotal in the allocation of 
donor development assistance and Somali development policy and that are not 
well supported by available data from Somalia or other African countries with 
similar conditions. We also tried to assess the implications for development 
policy of alternative assumptions. Through this iterative process we 
identified critical issues about which we tried to gather additional data 
through interviews with government officials, development practitioners, 
Somali social scientists, and brief but targeted field work in the Hargeisa 
area, the Bay region, the lower Shebelle, and Mogadishu. 
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS 
Somalia is widely regarded as a hopeless case. Conventional measures 
of GDP per capita place it near the bottom rung of the "least developed" 
countries. Its climate is harsh, its population scattered, and its 
infrastructure and modern institutions poorly developed. Rates of growth have 
been disappointing and the prospects for improvement seem to be bleak. The 
formal economy has been in crisis since at least 1978. The Somali indigenous 
rural private sector is generally regarded as inefficient and static. The 
Somali government has intervened directly in many product markets, on the 
assumption that private traders are incapable of providing adequate bulking, 
storage, transport, and distribution services. Labor markets are thought to 
be poorly developed and to function poorly in allocating Somali human 
resources. 
Agriculture in Somalia is considered to be inefficient, environmentally 
destructive, and more or less permanently in a state of crisis. Somalia's 
extensive rangelands are believed to be overstocked and overpopulated and 
therefore degraded. Somalia's arable lands, by contrast, are thought to be 
under-utilized and thus to have great potential for both intensification and 
extensification of production through the extension of known technologies. 
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Development strategies enunciated both by the Government of Somalia and 
by international donors have largely abandoned further development of 
import-substituting industries because of the small domestic market and 
managerial problems and have concentrated instead on the intensified 
exploitation of the country's land and water resources. They rely heavily on 
the transition from nomadic pastoralism to more sedentary livestock production 
through better regulation and range management and to sedentary agriculture 
through the introduction and dissemination of improved crop technology and the 
development of large-scale irrigation. Somalia's "fragile" human resource 
base is identified as a major obstacle to such a transformation, and it is 
believed that extensive efforts in training and extension and accompanying 
changes in attitudes and values are needed. 
MAJOR FINDINGS 
In a number of important respects our review does not support this 
bleak image of Somalia's present economic and institutional situation or 
future prospects. 
Economic Issues 
Looked at solely in terms of officially-sanctioned economic act1v1ty 
taking place within the national borders, the situation is indeed dismal. But 
in contrast with the anemic formal economy, a vibrant parallel economy has 
been flourishing which makes use of substantial earnings remitted by Somalis 
residing outside the nation's borders. If these activities are taken into 
account, estimates of the proportions of people receiving incomes below the 
poverty line drop substantially. This bears out casual observation that fails 
to support the idea that Somali citizens are poorer than citizens of many 
other low-income African countries. 
The major reason that development plans and donor analyses have 
concentrated on intensified utilization of livestock and agricultural 
resources is that their orientation has been exclusively on Gross Domestic 
Production (the production of income taking place within the territorial 
boundaries of the country), rather than on Gross National Product (the 
production of income accruing to nationals of the country, regardless of 
location). Yet the latter concept is the more appropriate one for judging the 
economic well-being of Somali people. Thus the substantial earnings of 
Somalis in the Gulf is not counted in GDP and is frequently seen as causing 
lower GDP because of the "drain" of manpower from the economy, even though it 
provides higher levels of living for those individuals while they are out of 
the country and also, through remittances, for their families staying behind. 
Unrecognized Institutional Strength 
The "inward-looking" development strategy currently supported by major 
donors fails to recognize Somalia's real potential which is based on its two 
main resources -- a resourceful, skilled, and highly adaptable population and 
a strategic location. These are the two assets that have been capitalized on 
to generate rapid economic development in the resource-poor economies of Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Japan, Of course, the specific nature of 
Somalia's human and locational resources differ from those Asian examples, so 
that the particular ways in which they can be exploited to advantage are not 
identical. But the strategy of building on strengths is certainly applicable. 
Contrary to the assumption riddling almost all "expert" reports on 
Somalia, the human resource base is not "fragile," unskilled, and ill-adapted 
to the imperatives of development. The nomadic peoples of Somalia have 
adapted ingeniously to the requirements for wresting a living from a harsh and 
unpredictable environment. Their ability to identify useable grazing 
resources spread over vast territories and appearing sporadically is 
impressive. More important, they have adapted forms of social organization 
that facilitate exploitation of these ephemeral assets to minimize subsistence 
risk, In order to take advantage of widely-scattered pastures, Somali 
extended-family units have divided herds into several "management units" which 
are entrusted to individuals or small groups which then scatter widely during 
wet seasons and return to some extent to more concentrated dry season water 
and pasture areas. Each ''management unit 11 has considerable autonomy and 
responsibility and is required to take initiative in response to swiftly 
changing environmental conditions, At the same time, the larger unit serves to 
allocate resources to the smaller management units and provides pooling of 
risks through some reallocation of herds and consumption in response to 
losses. In the interriverine region of southern Somalia the assets exploited 
by the extended families include arable land as well as livestock. 
This same organizational form has facilitated Somali response to 
non-pastoral opportunities as well. Since World War I, substantial numbers of 
Somalis have engaged in trade and transport in scattered communities 
throughout East Africa and parts of the Gulf. The ability of family units to 
have members in far-flung locations, providing trustworthy management of 
common resources and facilitating flows of reliable information, has been 
crucial to their success. That these outposts have remained parts of larger 
pan-territorial family units is evident from the frequent movement of 
individuals between locations with maintenance of a base within Somalia, 
Recently, large-scale movement of Somalis for wage employment in the Gulf 
seems to have been facilitated by these extended family networks, and visible 
signs of remitted earnings, including investment in water tanks (birkets) in 
pastoral areas, bear witness to the continuing vitality of extended family 
organization for allocating resources in response to new oportunities and 
using the incomes generated for common purposes, 
Diversification of specific skills within family units seems to have 
gone apace with animal husbandry and pasture management being supplemented by 
commercial, trading, and mechanical (particularly driving and vehicle repair) 
abilities, Many families are pursuing diversified income-generating and 
risk-pooling strategies spanning livestock and crop production, trade, and 
wage employment, both in urban areas and abroad, To some extent these 
families can be viewed as multi-plant multi-national enterprises in microcosm, 
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and the same principles of decentralized management with centralized resource 
pooling used by the modern corporation are employed to advantage. This 
underlying organizational form is the reservoir from which is drawn 
entrepreneurial responses to new private opportunities in agriculture and 
trade. 
The other resource upon which Somalia can draw is its strategic 
location in the booming economy of the Gulf. While lacking the proven oil 
resources of the Arabian Peninsula, Somalis have benefited from access on 
favorable terms to those markets for export of meat and labor services. Any 
reasonable long-range strategy for Somalia must take account of the 
opportunities offered by economic integration into this larger Gulf economy, 
while seeking means for making such access more secure and beneficial to 
Somalis. 
For Somalia, perpetuation of an extreme inward-looking development 
strategy based only on domestic product forces attention on the country's 
weakest resources - its arid and semi-arid ecology. An outward-looking 
strategy, attempting to maximize national product, can build on the country's 
most valuable assets - its people and location. 
Somalia represents in an extreme degree the case of a governmental 
"formal" economy in shambles, while the parallel or "informal" economy 
flourishes. While this represents a failure to establish a smoothly 
functioning modern state apparatus, which has been taken by many to be the 
sine qua non of political development, it may not be as disastrous for the 
peopl"e..s might appear from official statistics. Many other African 
countries, notably Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania, have exhibited similar 
tendencies in recent years and, in fact, the syndrome may be more of the rule 
than the exception in the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, this presents crucial problems both for the national 
leadership and for donor agencies. All agree that breakdown of the basic 
legitimacy of national political and economic institutions is harmful in the 
long run and, in the short run, may lead to breakdown of law and order and 
gross violations of human rights (witness Uganda). 
There clearly is a dilemma. Efforts to increase the ability of 
government to mobilize resources are frequently met by increased reliance on 
parallel markets, thereby further eroding the economic base of government and 
making coercion appear the only viable means of maintaining control. Recent 
emphases on the private sector, downgrading the role for government, provide a 
partial alternative but raise fundamental questions of what roles governments 
must play and how ruling groups can maintain political support in an 
environment where the levers of power are connected to very little. 
Agricultural Marketing and Internal Trade 
The Somali government has played a very active role in agricultural 
marketing. It has intervened directly in many product markets on the 
assumption that 1) private traders are incapable of providing adequate 
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bulking, storage, transport and distribution services, 2) government agencies 
can provide such services more efficiently, and 3) private traders exploit 
both producers and consumers by colluding to set prices and make monopoly 
profits. Donors in turn, have supported state intervention in the marketing 
system by channeling large amounts of concessionary imports through the 
parastatal marketing agencies and by building project interventions around 
their services. 
Evidence from elsewhere in Africa, supported by information collected 
in Somalia, leads to a radically different set of working hypotheses than 
those underlying past Somali policy. First, state marketing agencies are less 
able to provide adequate marketing services than are private traders. Private 
trade tends to overshadow state marketing activity even in the countries where 
such trade is severely restricted. Transport, credit, and other bottlenecks 
may keep the cost of private market services relatively high, but government 
attempts to set up an alternative marketing system, rather than to address the 
constraints in existing private marketing, have generally not improved the 
services available to producers and consumers. Second, in most cases private 
traders can provide marketing services more efficiently than do state 
agencies. The high cost and inefficiency of state marketing has been one of 
the reasons why private trade has flourished in parallel markets. Third, 
competition among private traders is intense, and market prices reflect 
supply, demand, and marketing costs. There is virtually no empirical evidence 
that private traders effectively control prices or that they reap monopoly 
profits. Information collected in Somalia in July 1982 supports these 
hypotheses and directly contradicts the assumptions underlying past Somali 
marketing policy. 
There has been little analysis of the cost of government intervention 
in the marketing system or of the effectiveness of such interventions in 
meeting policy goals. The level of and response to producer incentives are key 
elements in evaluating the costs of government market interventions and the 
compatibility of different policy goals, such as increased production and low 
consumer prices. Although most reviews of the Somali agricultural sector 
express concern about producer incentives for both crops and livestock, the 
marketing system for agricultural commodities has received little sustained 
attention. The general importance given to producer incentives in strategy 
documents has not led to an examination of how prices are determined or of how 
the marketing system performs. This has been costly in terms of both policy 
recormnendations and project interventions. 
Labor Markets 
The characteristics of Somali labor markets are rarely, if ever, 
discussed in documents concerning Somali development. The implied assumption 
of many agricultural sector documents and project proposals is that labor 
markets are poorly developed and do not function well in allocating Somali 
human resources. This is reflected in the extremely low opportunity costs of 
rural labor assumed in many project economic analyses and the more general 
assumptions that tradition dictates the current allocation of labor in the 
crop and livestock sectors, rather than adaptation to economic opportunities. 
As for many other aspects of the Somali economy, there are few data 
available for a thorough analysis of labor markets. Even casual observation of 
wages and the domestic labor market suggests, however, that the above 
assumptions correspond very poorly with reality. There is every indication of 
a very active national labor market. Data gathered informally in July 1982 
shows that nominal wages within urban areas and between different rural 
regions are remarkably uniform. Most informal sector activities such as petty 
trade, water delivery, forage gathering, portering, and construction yield 
average daily earnings of SoSh 40-50/day during the winter dry season to SoSh 
70-80/day during the spring rains, but remain nearly constant between regions 
in the South. Information about the availability of wage employment, the 
variation in seasonal, sectoral, and national wage rates, and the costs of 
moving in response to such opportunities is available in even the remotest 
villages visited in the Bay Region. The market may not be in equilibrium and 
information may not be perfect, but villagers explain changes in seasonal and 
long-term labor migration in terms of wage differentials and the monetary and 
psychic costs of moving. 
This disparity between the implied assumptions of development documents 
and the reality of Somali labor markets has two major implications. First, it 
has fostered a very narrow and isolated view of the Somali economy and of 
sectors within the economy. Inattention to the mobility of labor and its true 
opportunity costs has, in turn, led to a large number of questionable project 
interventions. It has been assumed that labor is readily available for 
expansion of agricultural activities without any reference to the real 
opportunity cost of that labor. The USAID Bay Region project paper, for 
example, assumes that the opportunity cost of dry-season labor for land 
clearing is only SoSh 4/day, while the IBRD appraisal assumes the opportunity 
cost of peak-season agricultural labor is only SoSh 10/day, wages much lower 
than our survey indicates are realistic. Even more costly than specific 
project interventions that fail, however, is the failure of agricultural 
research activities to take into account existing labor constraints and the 
large number of alternate options producers face in moving beyond subsistence 
production. Unless an integrated view of agriculture's place in the economy 
and of the constraints to its expansion are reflected in research activities, 
Somalia will be doomed to another generation of the same failed development 
efforts. 
Agricultural and Rural Development 
We do not find donor assumptions about existing patterns of production 
or the policies based on them well supported by available data. Nor do we 
believe that major gains in agricultural production can be achieved by 
strengthening government agencies so that they can more effectively impose 
rational resource management in the pastoral sector, promote agro-pastoral 
integration, and introduce known, readily available technologies. 
On the contrary, our analysis strongly suggests that existing pastoral 
and agricultural systems of production are reasonably efficient and well 
adapted to Somalia's harsh climatic conditions, that private (parallel) 
markets function well, and that, despite the obvious disruptions caused by 
natural disaster and war, there has been broad participation by rural Somalis 
in labor migration, commercial production, and a rising physical standard of 
living for a substantial segment of the rural population. 
The pivotal assumption that pastoralism is in a state of crisis because 
of over-population, overstocking, and resultant degradation has not been 
tested by serious research. While there is clearly "hot spot" degradation from 
overstocking near towns and points of commercial concentration, there is no 
clear evidence of the general decline in calving rates, animal condition, or 
human nutrition that normally accompanies a widespread deterioration of 
pastoral environments. Labor migration and pennanent migration to towns from 
the pastoral sector appear to be a response to opportunities for higher 
incomes, rather than to worsening env'ironmental or economic conditions in 
pastoral areas. 
The assumption that dryland agriculture can easily be intensified and 
extended to new areas is not well supported by recent land use studies in the 
Bay region which suggest that present cultural practices are reasonably 
efficient under present factor endowments, that present techniques are 
conservationist in character, and that there is much less unused arable land 
in the region than had formerly been estimated. 
The assumption that irrigation is the best road to food security - as 
opposed, for example, to the adoption of an outward-looking development 
strategy that would enable Somalia to purchase food in periods of cyclically 
low rainfall - should be carefully evaluated through studies that have not yet 
been undertaken. Past experience with irrigation in Somalia indicates that, in 
addition to environmental problems with flow and drainage and the difficulties 
in managing large-scale enterprises of all kinds, serious social and 
institutional difficulties remain to be overcome. Salient among these are the 
provision of adequate security of tenure and incentives for small-scale 
producers, the decentralization of water control to local water user 
associations, and the adoption of suitable technology for partially 
decentralized water management. 
The assumption that pastoralists and transhumant farmers should live in 
permanent settlements must be regarded with caution in light of the ecological 
imperative of "following the rain" and past experience with large-scale 
planned resettlement of refugees. 
In sum, it appears to us that an inward-looking development strategy 
that focuses almost exclusively on raising agricultural production through the 
introduction of "modern range management" and technology presumed to be 
readily available is neither efficient nor effective. Furthermore, we believe 
that the premature expansion of government extension services in the absence 
of an effective package may, in the Somali social and institutional context, 
merely exacerbate existing bureaucratic tendencies towards over-centralization 
in planning and decision making, further inflate the public sector payroll, 
inhibit growth in the indigenous private sector, reinforce mutually 
antagonistic attitudes between extension agents and producers, and create a 
bureaucratic constituency that will make it politically difficult for the 
government to adopt new and more liberal economic policies in the future. 
In our view, higher levels of production can be achieved at a reasonable 
cost only by: 1) conducting studies that correctly identify constraints in 
existing systems of production and distribution; 2) addressing these 
constraints by developing affordable technology and making appropriate 
services available; 3) strengthening infrastructure; 4) strengthening existing 
incentives for production, savings, and investment by the rural household 
through altered government policies; 5) encouraging existing participatory 
organizations based on locality or traditional ties to engage in developmental 
activities; and 6) ensuring that small-scale users and associations have 
reasonably secure tenure over land, water, and pasture resources, so that they 
do not lose traditional resource rights as these increase in value. These 
changes must be made in ways that will enable rural Somalis to exercise their 
manifest entrepreneurial talents more fully and that will not increase their 
dependence on an expanding and remote government bureaucracy. 
We believe that significant improvements can be made in all of these areas 
without a major increase in expenditures, provided modifications are made in 
on-going and projected development initiatives. Before trying to intervene in 
the rural economy and production systems, both governments and donors would be 
well advised to understand first how Somalis presently manage their 
resources. Instead of beginning with the assumption that existing systems of 
resource use and labor allocation in agriculture, livestock rearing, or in 
trade, transport, and commerce are dysfunctional by virtue of being 
"traditional," it would be more effective to assume that they are functional 
responses to particular opportunities and then identify points at which 
intervention could help them to work better. 
Development for Somali Pastoralists: For three decades development planners 
have seen the system of livestock production in Somalia as a system in 
crisis. Over the years there have been changes in the descriptions of the 
dimensions of that crisis, in the ascription of its causes, and in the 
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prescriptions for its alleviation. The calmer voices have been those which 
assume livestock production merely to be backward or stagnant, and call for 
its general improvement. The shriller voices assert that disaster has either 
already befallen the system or will do so at any moment, and they call for 
radical reorganization. 
The perpetual claim of crisis has justified a great variety of 
interventions. Almost all have failed, at least in the sense of having an 
impact on the pastoral production systems of Somalia. But there has been no 
research into the technical or economic parameters of those systems, and 
little use has been made of the social analyses of the pastoral systems that 
do exist. With little relationship between attempts at intervention and sound 
knowledge of systemic constraints based on production research or monitoring, 
it is hardly surprising that livestock interventions in Somalia have been so 
unrewarded. 
Fortunately the pastoral system itself is thriving: with minimal 
interference, it supports the subsistence of between 60 and 80 percent of the 
population; it provides fresh milk and other dairy products daily to the 
burgeoning urban populations of Somalia; it provides over 80 percent of the 
_foreign trade earnings of Somalia; it supplies 38 percent of the preferred 
live-slaughtered meat for the whole Arabian Peninsula and holds first rank 
there as the source of livestock imports; and while providing 1.5 million 
animals to the export trade and nearly another half million to domestic 
municipal slaughter, the system has proven resilient enough to recover from 
the 1974-75 drought, to utilize pastures in the Ethiopian Ogaden despite 
continuing warfare between the two countries, and to provide steadily 
improving prices to producers. 
Somali pastoral livestock production has been partly oriented to 
commercial markets for centuries. Surplus dairy products (milk and ghee) are 
sold, as are the vast bulk of male animals unnecessary to breeding or 
transport operations and the hides or skins of animals killed for meat. 
Changes in the mix of species in the national herd toward cattle and sheep and 
away from camels reflect sensitivity to the market for meat in Saudi Arabia, 
but it is not known what effects such changes may be having upon the 
rangelands or upon subsistence security. The livestock trade has consistently 
thrived and is an outstanding example of the efficacy of the Somali private 
sector: even in the periods of strongest government challenge to private 
capital, livestock merchants were much too important to national revenues to 
be tampered with. Trade has expanded into the hinterlands with transport 
growth, and the new national highway has permitted deeper penetration of the 
countryside by the major traders. Supply constraints, on the other hand, are 
not known, since there is neither accurate information on production nor on 
effective services available to the primary producers. 
The livestock sector in Somalia and its various systems of production and 
exchange have only barely begun to be described in any detail. As compared 
even with similar semi-arid pastoral areas in the West African Sahel or in 
anglophone East Africa, little is known of the basic parameters of production 
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and market conditions. With only a weak development of administrative field 
capacity or academic interest during colonial days, the post-independence 
governments of Somalia have been severely handicapped in planning programs 
addressed to the economic or social realities of the countryside. In lieu of 
projects generated by knowledge from "below," as it were, developers have been 
forced to rely on poorly verified hypotheses about what needs to be done. 
Somali pastoralism has three major dimensions. First, the distribution of 
feed and water resources has given rise to a supple ecological adaptation 
which entails wide-ranging transhumance by small camping groups between 
permanent dry season water points (usually wells) and rainy season grasslands 
with only temporary surface water. Like nearly all "nomads, 11 Somalis never 
wander aimlessly, but rather have fixed home areas from which they move as the 
seasons and vegetational growth require. Second, to maximize productivity and 
to disperse risk, Somalis have diversified their livestock production 
enterprises, just as they engage in non-livestock production when it is 
feasible to do so. Ecological variation means that some species of livestock 
are especially well suited to particular zones or niches of the total 
rangeland resource. Camels and goats are primarily browsers (each at a 
different level of the "aerial" or arboreal pasture), while sheep and cattle 
graze. Third, Somalis guarantee their own physical and social security 
through formal contracts of alliance among men who calculate their loyalties 
to one another in terms of kinship. The contracts make concrete the political 
obligations of lineage-mates and their followers, who also collaborate to 
share certain labor tasks, to defend or extend grazing areas, to redistribute 
basic productive resources to individuals in need, and to aggrandize the power 
of the lineage as a whole. While the affirmation of lineage and clan 
solidarities has been officially discouraged since the early 1970s, the social 
obligations that close kin bear to one another remain powerful influences in 
their lives, especially in the absence of effective alternatives. The major 
corollary of these social ties for livestock production is that Somalis 
already have networks in place that provide resource access, mediate disputes, 
and assure overall conservation for the general (lineage) good. 
Development of Dryland Agriculture: Dryland farming directly supports only 14 
percent of the Somali population and occupies less than one percent of the 
total land area. Its significance in development policy planning is greater 
than is indicated by its present economic role, for it is believed that the 
intensification and extensification of cultivation can substantially increase 
crop production, help reduce the national food deficit and perhaps absorb 
excess population from the pastoral sector. In support of this policy USAID 
and other donors are currently financing a major agricultural development 
project in the interriverine area. 
The distribution of permanent human settlements in the region corresponds 
closely to the distribution of land with the highest potential for cultivation 
in terms of soil fertility and rainfall. In these areas the arable farming 
system is long established, stable, and makes effective use of existing 
resources. Approximately 90 percent of the land in the cultivation cycle is 
under crops in any given year, and only 10 percent in fallow. In some areas 
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up to 70 percent of the land is in the cultivation cycle, The land around the 
settled and cultivated areas with lower potential for cultivation is used for 
grazing, In addition, there are apparently extensive areas of range which are 
under-utilized during the dry season because they lack an all-year water 
supply. 
The standard classification of households into sedentary farming and 
nomadic is misleading, for it masks the fact that households of two or three 
types are often grouped together in larger extended family managemenent 
units. The individual households, under the management of closely related 
kinsmen, enjoy considerable autonomy in day-to-day affairs but constitute a 
single extended family unit in regard to the allocation of resources and the 
pooling of risk. Individual household members, capital, and consumer goods 
can be transferred from one household to another to adjust income and 
consumption imbalances, to obtain higher prices for produce, to take advantage 
of employment opportunities, to start a new enterprise such as a shop, to 
place a child closer to a school, or for other similar purposes. 
The income generating strategies and farming practices of Bay Region 
households and extended families are well adapted to meeting the challenge and 
risks of exploiting pastures and good soils in an uncertain climate. The 
basic agricultural strategy is agro-pastoral and is characterized by a high 
degree of spatially decentralized and well coordinated integration of 
cultivation and livestock production. This agro-pastoral strategy is 
complemented by a strategy of moving labor to the riverine zone during the dry 
season and, in times of severe drought, taking refuge there. In the present 
century income strategies have been broadened to include migrant wage labor 
on modern sector plantations, in Mogadishu, and most recently in the Gulf 
states. An increasing number of extended families have also been investing in 
commercial enterprises, urban real estate and transportation (trucks). 
This pattern of flexible organization and income strategy has enabled Bay 
Region households to cope with the rigors and risks of an unpredictable 
climate and to take advantage of changing opportunities in their wider 
economic and political environment. It has also created important linkages 
between local, national, and even international comodity and labor markets as 
households allocate their energies and resources between differing productive 
activities in response to changing conditions. 
Understanding the nature of variations in household and extended family 
organization and the linkages between the local and national economy is 
essential to formulating an effective rural and agricultural development 
strategy for the Bay Region and other regions in Somalia. It is unrealistic 
to regard Bay Region farmers as isolated, tradition-bound, and static and to 
expect that their options will be narrowly constrained by their local, 
agricultural enterprise alone. Thus, for example, it would be unrealistic to 
assume that there are no opportunity costs to additional labor inputs required 
by new agricultural practices, that there are no risks in further agricultural 
intensification and specialization, or that there are no savings available for 
capital investments in the region. Similarly, development projects focused 
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narrowly on one sector are likely to have unanticipated consequences for the 
total economy of a region. Planning will have to take these institutional and 
economic realities into account, and for this to be possible it is of the 
utmost importance that studies be launched that will illuminate them with 
greater clarity. 
The Bay Region is currently witnessing the implementation of its first 
major development project. This project, which is experimental in nature 
though ambitious in size and scope, represents a first exploratory step 
towards tapping the potential of the interriverine "internal frontier" to 
support a greater and more settled population and to produce more food crops 
for urban markets. The project was designed under severe time constraints 
and, for this reason, was based on a number of widely held but not well tested 
assumptions about the region and its people. In this report we critique these 
assumptions and the project interventions that flowed from them and suggest 
ways that the project can be strengthened during its second phase. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis presented in this report supports two broad changes of 
emphasis in Somali development policy. The first is a shift away from the 
present extremely inward-looking development strategy based only on domestic 
product, which focuses attention on the country's weakest resources - its arid 
and semi-arid ecology, towards an outward-looking strategy that attempts to 
maximize national product by building on the country's most valuable but 
undervalued assets - its people and location. 
In the short run, following an outward-looking strategy requires taking 
maximum advantage of opportunities for labor export to the Gulf. Agreements 
should be sought with Gulf states to make this source of income more 
dependable and secure. Policies must be designed to facilitate channeling 
these earnings in ways that will be most beneficial to Somali families in 
providing access to higher and more reliable incomes. At the same time, 
adjustments in the fiscal system will be required to insure that appropriate 
functions of government can be financed and that earnings abroad will bear a 
fair share of the tax burden. 
In the long run it is quite possible that Somalia can develop an efficient 
export-oriented manufacturing and service sector that will maximize returns to 
human resources and location through exploiting the markets of the Gulf. An 
outward-looking strategy must be seen as a complement, rather than an 
alternative to a strategy that continues to seek increases in agricultural and 
livestock production. 
The second major policy change recommended is a shift away from the 
present overly centralized, controlling, top-down and technically naive 
transformational approach to rural and agricultural development, to an 
approach that builds on the strengths of indigenous systems of agriculture and 
resource management; knowledge of the environment, and commercial and 
entrepreneurial activity. Adopting this approach requires that more attention 
be given to correctly identifying constraints in existing agricultural and 
economic systems and to lifting these constraints in ways that will enable 
rural Somali households and larger groupings to function more efficiently 
without reducing their ability to cope with the risks imposed by their harsh 
environment or their ability to transfer labor and capital resources from one 
location to another in response to changing needs and opportunities. 
A number of recommendations for policy changes, priority studies, 
institution-strengthening activities and project modification discussed in 
detail in analyses in the preceding chapters follow from and support these 
broad shifts in Somali development policy. 
Policy Recommendations 
In coordination with other donors USAID should use its non-project aid 
leverage to urge the following policy changes: 
1. Generate additional foreign exchange by linking some large fraction of 
foreign exchange remitted by workers abroad to "open general license" for 
imports. 
2. Provide the Somali government with greater incentives to increase domestic 
food production by making a donor agreement to substitute other 
commodities in response to decreased demands for food aid. 
3. Diminish the role of administered allocation of imports to ensure broad 
participation and competitive conditions in the private sector expansion 
of marketing and services. 
4. Assist the government of Somalia in meeting its essential recurrent 
expenditures by allowing counterpart funds generated by commodity sales to 
be used for general budgetary support. Such funds should not be earmarked 
for development activities that would not otherwise have been undertaken. 
5. Abandon the policy of guaranteed employment in the government for all 
school leavers and establish salary scales that will attract and hold 
essential qualified personnel in the context of Somali labor markets. 
6. Reassess general educational policy and institutional capacity in relation 
to the potentially increased earnings and remittances that can be obtained 
by a more skilled emigrant labor force in the Gulf states. 
7. Assess carefully the longer range potential for increased local 
manufacturing for export to the Gulf states. 
To build upon the strengths of Somalia's rural economy and the indigenous 
institutions, knowledge and agricultural practices upon which it rests, the 
following changes in rural and agricultural development policies are 
recommended. 
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8. Capitalize on the strength of the indigenous private sector and manifest 
entrepreneurial and commercial skills of rural Somalis by: 
A. Continuing to reduce the role of government parastatals in grain 
marketing; 
B. Giving clear signals to private grain traders that their activity is 
legal and that bulking is permitted; 
C. Distributing agricultural inputs through the private sector; 
D. Encouraging the private provision of tractor and other agricultural 
services wherever possible; 
E. Permitting the importation and distribution of spares and building 
materials through the private sector; and 
F. Ensuring the availability of basic consumer goods to provide adequate 
incentives for increased production. 
9. Shift to an incremental approach that takes account of the strengths as 
well as the weaknesses of existing farming systems. This will require 
major changes in policies concerned with agricultural research, extension, and 
training; settlement policy; and the choice of technology, such as: 
A. 
B. 
Developing an agricultural research strategy that will provide a 
basis for assigning priorities, directing work in particular 
disciplines and integrating disparate activities into a coherent 
program. This strategy must be based on information about current 
production systems and the technical, economic, and social 
constraints that jointly limit their expansion so that research can 
be addressed from the outset to the problems actually faced by Somali 
producers. Since this information is not presently available, it is 
essential that procedures to obtain it and to plan appropriate 
experimental work become a permanent, formalized part of the 
agricultural research and planning program. This requires an 
institutional framework within which teams of biological and social 
scientists work jointly in each stage of the research process. 
Placing less emphasis in agricultural extension on the promotion of 
new cultural practices and technologies that have not yet been tested 
by rural Somalis, and greater emphasis on gathering information about 
regional variations in the kinds of problems faced by producers and 
their experience with traditional and newly introduced ways of 
responding to these programs. The formal training of extension agents 
should place much greater emphasis on what is known about the 
adaptability and resilience of indigenous farming systems in other 
African countries and in Somalia. Field training should include a 
period of supervised residence in rural communities and working 
seminars with farmers. Priority should be placed on recruiting 
extension workers with rural origins and assigning them to their home 
region, even if this requires remedial training in some subjects. 
C. Assisting the government of Somalia to re-assess its past policy 
favoring the planned settlement of pastoralists and semi-nomadic 
cultivators. 
D. Assisting Somali planners to re-assess criteria used in the choice of 
technology for agricultural projects in light of past experience in 
Somalia and elsewhere in Africa. 
10. Revise policies concerning access to natural resources, including water, 
browse and graze, and arable land, to give clearer recognition to the 
rights and responsibilities of "traditional" groups and institutions. This 
is necessary to ensure these groups security of tenure, to provide them 
with incentives to develop the resources, to counter rising levels of 
conflict concerning the control of natural resources that are taking on 
added value in the process of development, and to promote and strengthen 
existing resource conservation practices. This recommendation applies 
specifically to the range and water tenure of pastoral groups, the water 
and range management institutions in the interriverine area, and the 
rights of villagers who depend on flood recession agriculture for their 
livelihood. 
11. Use existing forms of local social organization in planning and 
implementing development initiatives. The current policy of minimizing 
recognition of traditional groups based on kinship, community, and 
religion is counterproductive. Such groups perform important functions in 
the articulation of rural peoples' interests, dispute settlement, the 
mobilization and management of resources for community projects, and the 
organization and management of commercial activities. 
Most of these organizations already play an important role in local 
government and rural development activities. This role can be enhanced by 
giving them increased recognition in the law, in administrative procedure 
and in the planning and implementation of development programs. The 
alternative of continuing to create new government and government 
sponsored institutions in the rural areas will continue to expand 
government's recurrent costs and will fail to capitalize on one of 
Somalia's most valuable resources, the resilient and flexible character of 
its indigenous social organization. 
Recommended Studies 
Because the data base needed for development decisions is extremely weak 
in Somalia we also recommend that USAID and other donors give high priority to 
funding selected studies. These include: 
o Policy-Simulation Model of the Somali Economy 
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o Labor Migration to the Gulf 
o Internal Labor Markets in Somalia 
o Microstudy of Household Income Strategies 
o Long Term Comparative Advantage Study 
o Commodity Markets Study 
o Social and Economic Context of Pastoralism, including a study of 
pastoral production, an anthropological study of the social aspects 
of pastoral production systems, and a study of commercialization. 
o Bay Region Income Strategies 
o Institutional Effectiveness Study 
Each study is designed to clarify one or more of the key assumptions that 
underlie development planning in Somalia discussed in this report. Each can be 
carried out in 12 to 15 months and will contribute information that is 
directly relevant to policy formulation and project design. They are 
comparatively modest in cost and are designed to provide indicative findings 
that represent a significant improvement over available data. It is also 
anticipated that carrying out the studies will contribute to the longer term 
objectives of developing a sampling frame and identifying meaningful questions 
in the Somali social and institutional context, creating a demand for better 
policy-relevant data, and increasing the capacity of Somali institutions to 
carry out applied social research for development. 
Strengthening Somali Capacity to Conduct and Use Policy-Relevant Social 
Science Research 
Despite the emphasis that has been placed on public sector intervention in 
projects and on administrative control over the economy, Somalia's capacity to 
generate and use socioeconomic data for central planning, control and 
supervision is extremely limited. While it will take many years to develop a 
data base and analytical capacity equivalent to those found in Kenya, Tanzania 
or a number of other African countries today, a number of steps in this 
direction should be taken immediately: 
1. USAID and other donors should give priority to funding the studies 
outlined above. Given the state of existing knowledge, substantial 
progress and contributions can be made with relatively crude, low-cost 
approaches of this kind to obtaining first approximations of the truth. 
2. A survey of research manpower needs in the government, the National 
Academy of Arts and Sciences and the University should be carried out. 
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3, Somalis who could benefit from graduate-level training in applied economic 
analysis, development anthropology and other social sciences overseas 
should be identified, as a first step towards meeting these research 
manpower needs. They should be given long-term training at institutions 
with experience in African development oriented research and should, to 
the extent possible, conduct their research in Somalia on problems for 
which they are likely to have responsibility upon the completion of their 
studies. 
4. The possibility of establishing a Development Research Institute similar 
to those found in Kenya, Tanzania, or Nigeria should be carefully explored. 
5. In the longer run, ways of strengthening social science development 
studies at the University should be found. 
